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Sclove: Equity--Parol Gifts of Land--Specific Performance--Statue of Frau

STUDENT NOTES
EQUITY -

PAROL GIFTS OF LAND

-

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

-

STATUTE OF FRAUDS - DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION. - Section 4 of
English Statute of Frauds,1 providing in part that no contract for
the sale of land' should be enforceable unless evidenced by a writing
signed by the party to be charged thereby or his agent, has been reenacted in Virginia and West Virginia. ' Since an agreement without legal consideration is nudum pactum in any event,' two normal
attributes of an agreement enforceable at law may thus be said to
be a legal considerationand a writing. Yet equity, burdened with
a conscience, almost everywhere seizes upon certain other facts as
an adequate substitute for a writing.' Strict adherence to the
statute, it is said, would often promote instead of suppress fraud.
Thus in West Virginia verbal contracts are specifllally enforced
where the vendee has received exclusive possession of the land
and made part payment of the purchase price or expenditures for
valuable improvements. There are numerous dicta that exclusive
possession alone will sustain the bill, that valuable improvements
will cure 7a defective possession, but that part payment alone is insufficient.
But this doctrine of part performance has also embraced a
29 Car. II, c. 3 (1677); see 6 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
(3rd ed. 1924) 379-97, for historical background of statute.
2 Italics here and following are ours.
'VA. REv. CODE (1930) c. 232, § 5561; W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36,
art. 1, § 3.
'3 HOLDSwoRTH, op. cit. supra n. 1, 412-13; 5 ibid. 296, 321-22; 6 ibid.
397; 8 ibid. 34-42; Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 350 n. a (1778), 101 Eng. Rep.
1014 (circum 1775); Eastwood v. Kenyon, 11 Ad. and E. 447, 113 Eng. Rep.
482 (1840).
56 HoLDswovrir, op. cit. supra n. 1, 393, 658-9; Butcher v. Stapeley, 1
Vern. 363, 23 Eng. Rep. 524 (1685). But see WALSH, TREATISE ON EQuiTy
(1930) 403-4, citing Albea v. Griffin, 2 Dev. & B. 9 (N. C. 1838); 1 Ames Cas.
Eq. 288, and cases cited, 289 n. from South Carolina, North Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee and Mississippi, "in several southern states the entire doctrine of enforcement of parol land contracts because of 'part performance'
is rejected . . . . equitable relief is given, however, by requiring the vendor
to pay the increased value of the land due to the purchaser's improvements,
plus payments of purchase money less rental value during the purchaser's
occupation'".
0 6 HOLDSWORTH, Zoo. cit. supra n. 5.
"Note (1924) 31 W. VA. L. Q. 58, 63; see Miller v. Lorentz, 39 W. Va.
160, 19 S. E. 391 (1894) (exclusive possession sufficient); Gibson v. Stalnaker, 87 W. Va. 710, 106 S. E. 243 (1921) (defective possession cured by
valuable improvements).
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imited class of cases where there is not even a legal consideration;
namely, parol gifts of land.' Our court has repeatedly said that
specific performance of such gifts would be decreed when supported by a meritorious consideration and when the donee has eirtered into possession and made valuable improvements on faith of
the gift.' The language of the cases indicates the strictness of proof
required. Thus, it is said, whereas in a contract on valuable consideration mere delivery of actual possession would be sufficient
part performance," in a gift there must be what takes the place
of valuable consideration-an expenditure of money or labor in
valuable improvements.'" The permanent improvements are such
as an owner would under the circumstances be likely to make on
his own estate, as contradistinguished from improvements made
by a tenant incident to occupation of the premises.' Possession
and inexpensive improvements do not raise the inference of a gift
to the son. Neither are loose declarations of a father, without explanation, sufficient evidence of a gift.
A contract" between
parent and child, from the nature of the relation, must be proved
by stronger evidence than Ithat which might suffice between
strangers; it should be direct, positive, express and unambiguous,
and the terms clearly defined." There must be identification of the
subject matter as to location and quantity." But Virginia long ago
simplified the matter and abolished the doctrine of part performance as to parol gifts of land. Specific performance of such gifts
SVALSH, op. cit. supra n. 5, 406-8; BROWNE, STATUTE Op FaAUDs

1895) § 491a.

(5th

ed.

'Sponaugle v. Warner, 98 W. Va. 532, 127 S. E. 403 (1925) (relationship
of putative father and illegitimate children as basis for meritorious consideration); Farrar v. Goodwin, 98 W. Va. 215, 126 S. E. 922 (1925) (uncle and
niece relationship); Berry v. Berry, 83 V. Va. 763, 99 S. E. 79 (1919)
(father-in-law and daughter-in-law); Grim v. England, 46 W. Va. 480, 33 S.
E. 310 (1899) (father and son); see Moss v. Moss, 88 IV. Va. 135, 106 S. E.
429 (1921) (father-son); Short v. Patton. 79 W. Va. 179, 90 S. E. 598
(1916) (father-son); White v. White, 64 W. Va. 30, 60 S. E. 885 (1908)
(father-son); Meadows v. Meadows, 60 W. Va. 34, 53 S. E. 718 (1906)
(father-son); Holsberry v. Harris, 56 W. Va. 320, 49 S. E. 404 (1904)
(father-son); Stone v. Hill, 52 W. Va. 63, 43 S. E. 92 (1902) (fatherdaughter); Harrison v. Harrison, 36 IV. Va. 556, 15 S. E. 87 (1892) (fatherson); Frame v. Frame, 32 W. Va. 463, 9 S. E. 901 (1889) (father-son).
10But this is only dictup, see supra n. 7.
" Crim v. England, supra n. 9, at 487.
Farrar v. Goodwin, supra n. 9, at 218.
"' From the whole context the court is apparently applying the term "contract" loosely to a gift.
"1Harrison v. Harrison, upra n. 9, at 560-1.
"r Short v. Patton, supra n. 9, at 182.
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is prohibited by statute unless evidenced by a writing even when
followed by possession and improvements."
The treatment of parol gifts is often subordinated to that of
contracts as if the latter were a broader inclusive term. Such
confusion and vague differentiation is unwarranted when the
present doctrine of consideration furnishes a basis for a sharp dis17
the court is apparently consoled
tinction. In Frame v. Frame
that "in some cases it is difficult, if not impossible, in principle
to distinguish gifts and sales." Equity has, nevertheless, gone far
afield in gift cases in dispensing both with a legal consideration
and a writing. Whether valuable improvements were a part of the
agreement so as to constitute a legal consideration for a father's
promise to convey land, or were simply made by a donee-son afterwards may involve a difficult interpretation of facts but there
should be no trouble in differentiating in principle. Again the
court said:'
"When the son enters and makes improvements by expenditures of money or labor, these acts change the situation
and fix the gift. Why? Because valuable consideration has
now entered into the transaction. The agreement of gift has
been partly performed by acts which can not be undone. A
valuable consideration may be a detriment to the promisee or
a benefit to the promisor. What was in its inception-promise
sustained only by a good consideration-has by such acts
become in effect a promise sustained by a valuable consideration."
Obviously the court could not mean legal consideration when
the improvements were not a stipulation in the agreement; besides,
to speak of legal consideration in connection with gift is inaccurate." And if the court meant to conjure up a new concept of
20 'Nor shall any right to a conveyance of any such estate or term in land
(estate of inheritance or freehold, or for term of more than five years) accrue to the donee of the land or those claiming under him, under a gift or
promise of gift of the same hereafter made and not in writing although such
gift or promise be followed by possession thereunder and improvement of
the land by the donee or those claiming under him", VA. RE%. CODE (1930)
c. 208, § 5141. It was intended by this section to require some evidence other
than parol evidence of a gift of land; it need not be under seal but only in
writing. Creed v. Goodson, 153 Va. 98, 149 S. E. 509 (1929); Brooks v.
Clintsman, 124 Va. 736, 98 S. E. 742 (1919); Wohlford v. Wohlford, 121
Va. 699, 93 S. E. 629 (1917).
27Supra n. 9, at 473.
2 6Frame v. Frame, supra n. 9, at 476; John W. Daniel, Verbal Sales and
Gifts of Beal Estate (1883) 7 VA. L. J. 193, 202.
19Likewise "contract of gift" is loose terminology, Meadows v. Meadows,
supra 31. 9, syllabus 1.
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equitable consideration, what of the idea that equity follows the
law and in decreeing specific performance presupposes a legally
binding contract, that is, one based on legal consideration." The
fact that equity will look behind a seal for valuable consideration
(in the common law sense) further illustrates the inconsistency.'
Finally, when the court says that the statute of frauds has no
application to a gift when the donee has taken possession and made
valuable improvements it necessarily implies that gifts are within
the statute when these special circumstances are not present.'
This must proceed on the mistaken notion that "contract" as used
in the statute broadly includes "gift;" hence, the want of a writing
is no insuperable obstacle to specific performance in either case
But the absence of legal
when the special circumstances exist.
gift
case.'
in
the
is
overlooked
consideration
The Virginia court seems correct both in principle and historically in saying that the statute of frauds has no bearing on
parol gifts of land founded on meritorious considerations." The
probable intention of the original authors of that statute can best
be surmised by referring to the state of the law in the seventeenth
century." The doctrine of consideration had just assumed the
procedural nucleus of its present-day form and denoted the sum of
conditions under which the action of assumpsit could be maintained, that is, for a wrong or deceit founded on a detriment to the
promisee." That it did not include other elements was not yet
2Pound, Consideration in Equityj (1918) 13 ILL. L. REv. 667-8, 679;
BROWNE, op. cit. supra n. 8, § 115a.
"Pound, Zoo. cit. supra n. 20, citing Jefferys v. Jefferys, Cr. & P. 138,
41 Eng. Rep. 443 (1841); also Pound, Progress of the Law (1920) 33 HARV.
L. REV. 834-5; JENKs, SHORT HiSTORY OP ENGLiSH LAW (1913) 216-18.
"Frame v. Frame, supra n. 9, at 475. In Farrar v. Goodwin, supra n. 9, at

217-18, counsel contended that certain improvements by an alleged donee
were not sufficiently extensive "to take the gift out of the statute of frauds"1.
The court, following this language, said that the improvements did "constitute proof of the alleged gift which satisfies the statute of frauds". In
Sponaugle v. Warner, supra n. 9, at 538, a case clearly involving an alleged
gift to children, the court used "contract" and "gift,, as if they were interchangable terms, saying that the writing involved might be "viewed either
as written evidence of an oral gift or as a memorandum in writing taking
the sale of realty out of the statute of frauds, and if supported by a
meritorious consideration, it might be specifically enforced".
"Pound, op. cit. supra n. 20, at 672, "for the most part they (courts of
equity) speak as if the whole question were one of the Statute of Frauds
ignoring the more serious question whether there is any contract at
all';'ibid. 674.
2Halsey v. Peters, 79 Va. 60, 69 (1884); 6 HonswORTHi, Zoo. cit. supra
n. 4.

"6 HoLDSwoRTH, op. cit. szpra n. 1, at 387-88.
20Supra n. 4.
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clear, but it had already been decided that a meritorious consideration would not support an assumpsit.' It would have been superfluous to provide an evidentiary requiirement for gifts in the
statute when they were unenforceable in any event for want
of legal consideration. ' The doctrine had yet to withstand the onslaught of Lord Mansfield who attempted to broaden it to include
moral obligation and motive and to distort the meaning of the
statute to reinforce his own theory of consideration. He maintained without success that the statute of frauds proceeded on the
principle that a writing sufficiently identified the contract so that
no consideration was necessary, which would have reduced the latter
to a mere evidentiary requirement.'
That the requirements for the enforcement of parol gifts of
land in West Virginia are meritorious consideration, possession
and valuable improvements, seems clear and apparently well
settled.' As already intimated, the opinions are often quite confusing in language as to whether contracts or gifts are involved,
but this has no essential bearing on the merits of the problem of enforcing such gifts. The Virginia statutory provision still remains
to be considered.'
Should gifts be enforceable only when in
writing and supported by a so-called meritorious and equitable consideration?
Judge E. 0. Burks, one of the revisers of the Virginia Code
of 1887, which first required a writing for parol gifts,' said that
their enforcement on oral testimany alone had been a most prolific
source of fraud.' But one need not go outside West Virginia to
illustrate the inherent possibilities for fraud. In Holsberry v.
Harris' an alleged donee-son failed to establish an oral gift from
his father as against his two sisters. The case went off on the
ground of insufficient possession. He had made valuable improvements, but after his father had distinctly told him not to put them
on the land now claimed. Apparently the son was awaiting his
father's death to rely on these improvements to establish a gift.
278

H LDSWORTH, op.

cit. supra u. 1, at 18, n. 2 and 3.

" Supra n. 4 and 23.

28 HoLDsworTH,
op. ct. supra n. 1, at 29-42; Pillans v. Van Mierop,
3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Reprint 1035 (1765).
Supra n. 9.
Supra n. 16.
2 VA. CODE (1887) § 2413, effective May 1, 1888.
'Burks' Address, 4 VA. BAR AssOCIATION REPORTS 117-18; Wohlford v.
Wohiford, supra n. 16, at 704, 93 S. E. at 630.
" Supra n. 9.
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In Meadows v. Meadows' the father was a very poor old man with
a large family of twelve and a small tract of land barely enough
for their support. He had magnanimously permitted his married
sons to move upon parts of the land. Such patriarchal settlements
are common in strictly rural districts. The plaintiff had built himself a worthless log cabin, and after an argument brought this bill
to deprive the father of ownership of his part. He had always
refused to contribute his share of the taxes. Two other sons testified that the father had no intention to make gifts inter vivos to
them although they were to have it afterwards. The bill was dismissed because of insufficient improvements. In the similar case
of Moss v. Moss' the court said:
"Where the proof tends to disclose an intention not to
vest title in the son by deed but by a devise in his will, operative after his death, and in the meantime to permit concurrent
use and enjoyment of the land by both, and it is so used in
common for residence, agriculture, etc. and the father grants
oil and gas leases, pipe line easements, collects and appropriates the compensation therefor, pays all the taxes, equity
will not compel a conveyance."
In White v. White" one son of a large family remained on
the home place with his father and made valuable improvements.
After the father's death, he claimed it as a gift to the exclusion
of the other heirs. Bill dismissed because the possession was not
exclusive. In the similar case of Short v. Patton sister and brother
were arrayed against each other. The brother failed to establish his
claim to all the land because of insufficient possession. The court
distinguished the contract case of Bryson v. McShane? as an exception to the rule of exclusive possession because there personal
services, peculiar in nature and under extraordinary circumstances,
were performed in consideration of a promise to convey property.
0
Duncan v. Duncan"
is interesting. The plaintiff had a deed to her
step-children canceled which she had executed under duress during
the days of her husband's last illness. He had bought the property,
now worth $2,500, in her name. The children admitted that the $1.00
recited consideration had never passed and that nothing was said
Supra n. 9.
Supra n. 9.
Supra n. 9.
31Supra n. 9.

48 W. Va. 126, 35 S. E. 348 (190]).
,0104 W. Va. 600, 140 S. E. 689 (1927).
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at the time of the execution of the papers that they would take care
of her the rest of her life, as they now alleged.
In all the above cases the donees were unsuccessful, no doubt
rightly so, but why not stop all this litigation at the source by the
simple expedient of requiring executory gifts to be in writing?
That Virginia has done so without any apparent injurious effect
affirms the truth of remarks made long ago with reference to the
whole policy of the statute of frauds-that if it had been rigorously
enforced, the result would probably have been that few instances of
parol agreements would have occurred; and agreements would,
from the necessity of the case, have been reduced to writing."
Even in cases where the court felt that the intention of the donor
to make an 6ral gift was sufficiently proved, one cannot help but
feel that such a donor would have been quite willing to execute
a writing had a statute so required." Cases like Sponaugle v.
Warner (West Virginia)' 3 and Creed v. Goodson (Virginia)" are
a pleasant relief because the problem is so simplified. In each there
was an informal writing signed by the donor; the donees were in
possession and had made valuable improvements.
It is submitted that West Virginia should abolish oral gifts
of real estate in as strict language as that now in force in Virginia,"
and, whereas our provision as to contracts merely renders them
unenforceable at law," the provision as to gifts should read "no
right shall accrue to the donee, etc." thus making oral gifts absolutely void both at law and in equity. An additional requirement
of a writing is thus added to those already necessary; namely,
meritorious consideration, possession and improvements." The enactment of such a statute would apparently leave oral contracts in
a preferred position, since they would still be enforceable in equity.
Still even there by the better and stricter view, a concurrence of
possession, part payment and valuable improvements is essential.'"
An alleged vendee, who has made no payment or only part payment of the purchase price, must tender the balance due in bringing
op. ct. supra n.8, § 492, quoting Lord Redesdale.
"Crin v. England; Farrar v. Goodwin, supra n. 9.
"BROWNE,

4Supra n. 9.

"Supra n. 16.
45 upra n. 16.
Supra n. 3.

,7Supra n. 9. The French law similarly requires all contracts which involve
more than a certain sum of money to be in writing; the French, German
and Italian Codes likewise require that promises to give shall be authenticated
by a judge or notary. Lorenzen, Cmasa and Considerationin Contracts (1919)
28 YALE L.

J.

642-43.

"WALsH, op. cit. supra n. 5, 399-401.
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his bill; hence, there is always a consideration actually passing
which is a helpful, if not a conclusive, factor. Whether or not the
statute of frauds ought to be strictly enforced as to contracts is a
question outside the purview of this note;"i it is simply asserted
that verbal gifts should be void, for without a writing there are at
most but conflicting inferences from the evidence of the intention
of the parties to affect their legal relations.
No good reason can be perceived for not enforcing written
gifts from a father to a son who enters into possession and makes
improvements.' It seems only a short jump to enforce a similar
gift to a stranger ;' and to those vigorous critics of the doctrine of
consideration who believe that a deliberate intention to affect ones
aegal relations should be the only requisite for a binding agreement
-- a written gift would be valid whether or not followed by the additional circumstances of possession and improvements. The
writer believes that all gifts of land under all circumstances should
be void unless in writing. How far one ought to go after that is
another question !'
-BERNARD

SCLOVE.

10See Note (1924) 31 W. VA. L. Q. 58, adopting the view that it was unfortunate that the statute of frauds was ever relaxed as to contracts; and,
since the doctrine of part performance is apparently so well embedded, its
application should be curtailed by requiring very strict acts of part performance. "Its (referring to the statute of frauds) evidential policy is
sound", 3 WiGmoa,

EVIDENCE (1904)

2091.

But see 6 HoLDswoRa,

Zoo.

cit. supra n. 1, noting adverse criticism of the statute particularly as to § 4

dealing with contracts and prophesying its repeal; also 8 ibid. 48, advocating
the repeal of § 4.
r4 The present law only achieves a limited breakdown of the doctrine of
consideration in cases involving a family relationship.
In Sponaugle v.
Warner, supra n. 9, a gift to illegitimate children was enforced.
aOne's viewpoint on this question will be influenced by the attitude towards the whole doctrine of consideration. A made a gift to B, a child whom
he mistakenly assumed had been adopted by himself; later A conveyed all
his property to his wife, C. Held, specific performance decreed for B against
the heirs of C. McCrilles v. Sutton, 173 N. W. (Mich.) 333 (1919); Pound,
Zoo. ct. supra n. 21.
Pound, op. ct. supra n. 20, 667-92; Lorenzen, Zoo. cit. supra n. 47, 62146; 8 HoLDswoRT,
loO. cit. supra n. 49. Holdsworth criticizes both the
statute of frauds and the present doctrine of consideration and advocates
the repeal of § 4 of the statute and the enactment of a provision that all
lawful agreements should be valid contracts, if the parties intended by their
agreement to affect their legal relations, and either consideration was present,
or the agreement was put into a writing signed by all the parties thereto.
West Virginia has already potentially broken down the doctrine of consideration in one instance. It is provided in the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act with reference to the delivery of a certificate with intent to transfer
but without an indorsement that the transferee may specifically enforce the
obligation of the transferor to make the necessary indorsement. W. VA.
REv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 1, § 49. A similar provision in New York has
been construed to apply to a donee although nothing is said as to gifts.
Reinhard v. Roby Co., 179 N. Y. S. 781, 110 Misc. Rep. 152 (1920).
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